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accuser la nature d'avarice, de mechancete et d ' impuis-
sance" apparait au contraire, grace a D a r w i n , comme " l a 
l o i providentielle par excellence, la l o i d'economie et 
d'abondance," montrant du meme coup la faussete des lois 
civiles et poli t iques, de meme que la morale religieuse q u i , 
par une "protection inintelligente accordee exclusivement 
aux faibles, aux infirmes, aux incurables, aux mechants 
eux-memes," perpetuent les maux et augmentent le mal 
aux depens d u bien. "Char i te imprudente et aveugle," 
ecrit Clemence Royer. "Fraternite obl igatoire" fondee sur 
une erreur: " O n en arrive a sacrifier ce q u i est fort a ce q u i 
est faible, les bons aux mauvais, les etres bien doues d'es-
pr i t et de corps aux etres vicieux et mal ingres ." Sous 
pretexte d'egalite, o n condamne l'espece a la "revelation 
irrationnnelle de la chute." 
P o u r moi , concluait Clemence Royer, l ' intrepide, je 
crois au progres. II est vrai qu'el le avait dit aussi: "je ne 
trouve pas necessaire, quant a moi , de discuter mes droits, 
q u a n d i l ne depend que de m o i de les prendre." Genevieve 
Fraisse remarque: " T o u t e sa vie, en effet, est en accord avec 
cette lettre." Toute sa vie et une grande partie de sa pensee! 
C o m m e q u o i i l n'est pas si simple de vouloir devenir le 
P y g m a l i o n d'une science q u i pose a la question seculaire 
de la justice tous les defis naissants d u darwinisme social. 
Lousie Marcil-Lacoste 
Universite de Montreal 
Ethics and H u m a n Reproduct ion : A Feminist Analysis. 
Christ ine Overal l . Allen and Unwin, 1987. 
T h i s book responds to an important need i n p h i l o -
sophic ethics. A significant number of contemporary 
philosophers has already ventured into the sensitive and 
widely expanding area dealing w i t h the ethics of h u m a n 
reproductive practice and technology; many others can be 
expected to j o i n the debate over the next few decades as 
technology continues to radically change and challenge 
our views on h u m a n reproduction. As Overa l l accurately 
observes, most of the phi losophic comment to date has 
been from either a nonfeminist or an antifeminist 
approach. Reproduction, and our societal attitudes toward 
it, profoundly influence the lives of women. Hence, 
reproductive practices cry out for a feminist phi losophic 
analysis. Overall 's book, l ike Gena Corea's powerful and 
inf luent ia l work, The Mother Machine: Reproductive 
Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial 
Wombs (New York : Harper and R o w , 1985), provides a 
thorough, systematic, feminist analysis of a variety of 
medical-social practices and attitudes having to do w i t h 
h u m a n reproduction. 
Overal l begins by indicat ing the sense she attaches to the 
" f e m i n i s t " aspect of her approach. For her, a feminist 
account involves " a commitment to understanding 
women's experience, beliefs, ideas, relationships, behav-
iour, creations, and his tory . " It includes an understanding 
of the fact that women are oppressed under patriarchy, and 
a conscious ideal of a v o i d i n g further aspects of patriarchal 
oppression. W h i l e I a m not sure she is right that a feminist 
analysis also requires a theoretical account of the origins 
of the oppression of women, I do agree w i t h her c l a i m that 
a feminist account must deliberately be str iving for an end 
to sexual inequality and oppression. 
In attempting to comply w i t h these guidelines and w i t h 
her further goal of evaluating issues i n reproduction i n 
terms of their effect o n the wel l -being of women and 
chi ldren, she distinguishes her o w n approach from any 
other analyses of h u m a n reproduction found i n p h i l o -
sophy. Those w h i c h ignore women's perspective and do 
not actively recognize and address the oppression of 
women i n our society, she describes as nonfeminist ; those 
w h i c h actually deny that w o m e n are oppressed under 
patriarchy and seek to preserve various existing sex differ-
ences perceived as being " n a t u r a l " are labelled anti femi-
nists. Clearly, a feminist approach to reproductive ethics 
can be expected to differ considerably from both nonfemi-
nist and antifeminist analyses. T h i s account differs from 
other ph i losophic analyses of reproductive ethics, both i n 
subject matter, i.e., the problems considered i n need of 
examinat ion , and i n the specific analysis of each problem, 
i n c l u d i n g the factors considered relevant i n the discussion 
of a problem area. For instance, as Overal l notes, the 
p h i l o s o p h i c literature to date o n reproductive issues has 
focused o n the issue of abortion, and both nonfeminists 
and antifeminists have addressed that issue almost exclu-
sively from the perspective of the fetus. Her commitment is 
to explore the whole area of reproductive ethics, attending 
to the experience and wel l -being of women and chi ldren. 
T h e issues she tackles include sex preselection, the sta-
tus of the embryo/fetus, abort ion, ch i ldbi r th , "surrogate 
motherhood, " inferti l ity and art i f ic ial reproduction, and 
the question of whether there is a sense i n w h i c h we have a 
r ight to reproduce. Her general view is that women must 
be given increased control over their o w n reproduction, 
and that they ought not to be viewed as being i n a competi-
tive relat ionship w i t h their (prenatal) offspring. Nonethe-
less, she also believes that embryos have a certain moral 
status f rom the moment of conception, and that a w o m -
an's control is l imi ted to determining what happens 
w i t h i n her o w n body. 
I f i n d the book w e l l researched and documented; it is a 
useful source for anyone seeking a clear, reliable survey of 
the literature addressing these problems, and it provides 
an ins ight fu l analysis of the issues. In the chapter o n 
c h i l d b i r t h , for example, she documents the increasingly 
c o m m o n medical view that w o m e n are i n confl ict w i t h 
their fetuses, pos ing risks to helpless embryos who, there-
fore, require physicians' protection. She challenges this 
perspective w h i c h conceives of ch i ldb i r th as a competi t ion 
between the interests of mother and fetus to be refereed and 
managed by the physic ian, and she demonstrates the 
dangers of these sorts of assumptions i n the heavily medi-
calized Western approach to ch i ldb i r th . Risks i n c h i l d -
bir th , i n Overal l 's view, must be evaluated by the pregnant 
w o m a n herself, since such evaluation must be done i n the 
context of the wider circumstances of her life. 
T h e specific feminism under ly ing the various chapters 
leans to what is generally seen to be l iberal feminism i n the 
c o m m o n taxonomy of feminist theories (liberal, Marxis t , 
socialist, and radical). She is h i g h l y respectful and largely 
uncri t ical of i n d i v i d u a l dec is ion-making i n reproduction, 
and strives o n l y to avoid policies that w i l l support the 
coercion of w o m e n in to specific choices w h i c h are ex-
ploitative or otherwise oppressive. She persuasively cr i t i -
cizes both free market analyses of surrogate motherhood 
and feminist analyses w h i c h see surrogate motherhood as 
a form of prost i tut ion o n the grounds that both accept the 
perspective that surrogacy may be treated merely as a sort 
of job. She sees the commodif icat ion of pregnancy and 
babies as the core problem of surrogacy, and we must 
wonder whether her solut ion of non-enforcement of sur-
rogacy contracts and p r o h i b i t i o n of advertising for surro-
gates is adequate for the threat surrogacy poses to social 
conceptions of women and their role i n reproduction. In 
the f ina l paragraph of the chapter on surrogacy, she points 
towards a more radical solut ion i n w h i c h the social con-
text of reproduct ion is changed so that it " i s n o longer 
labour performed by women for the benefit of men, 
and...the social condit ions w h i c h create the demand for 
surrogate motherhood disappear." A more radical femi-
nist analysis w o u l d spend far more time e x p l o r i n g and 
suppor t ing these f inal c laims and considering h o w we 
might br ing about such profound social change. 
H e r chapters o n sex preselection and artif icial reproduc-
t ion address the variety of experience w h i c h may lead 
people to seek the relevant medical technology. She does 
indicate the ways i n w h i c h the under ly ing desires may 
w e l l be suspect i n that they derive f rom unacceptable 
assumptions about gender, genetic l inks w i t h the chi ldren 
we might parent, and/or the importance of reproduction 
i n the social roles of w o m e n and men. Overa l l is also 
sympathetic to those seeking these sorts of technological 
interventions, p r o v i d i n g charitable bases for their interest 
wherever possible, and she is w i l l i n g to tolerate ind iv idua l 
pursuit of these technologies as l o n g as we, as a society, do 
not encourage or support their development and spread. 
She denies that anyone has a right to such services (though 
she does r ightful ly criticize current discriminatory prac-
tice w h i c h provides them only to middle class women i n 
stable, heterosexual marriages); but she stops short of 
p r o h i b i t i n g sex preselection, in vitro fertilization, ova 
donation, and embryo transfer altogether, since some-
times (if rarely) these are compatible w i t h genuine desires 
of individual women. Many other feminist authors (myself 
a m o n g them) have argued that we must go further and 
refrain from permit t ing these activities entirely, since 
i n d i v i d u a l interests do not outweigh the overall danger to 
the interests of women and chi ldren i n a society that 
pursues such practices i n even a l imited way. 
T h e most diff icult area of Overall 's analysis arises i n her 
discussion of the status of the embryo and fetus. L i k e other 
feminists, she recognizes that women's freedom depends 
o n our reproductive freedom, and reproductive control 
requires access to abortion (though she stops short of 
support ing abortion o n demand, suggesting that abortion 
can be w r o n g if, for instance, the pregnancy was planned 
and her reasons are frivolous). She argues that abortion is 
restricted to removing the fetus from her body; it does not 
involve seeking the death of the fetus, should it survive 
expuls ion. There are two reasons cited for this l imi ta t ion : 
first, an important element of her analysis is a resistance to 
the commodif icat ion of reproduction and its products. 
She argues that reproduction and the embryos and c h i l d -
ren it produces ought not to be seen as commercial objects 
to be purchased or owned. Hence, the embryo/fetus is not 
owned by anyone, not even its mother. I agree completely 
w i t h this aspect of her analysis. I do, however, have reser-
vations about the conclusion she draws from this critique 
to the effect that, because she does not o w n it, the w o m a n 
cannot control what happens to the embryo when it is 
removed from her body. M y concerns have to do w i t h her 
second reason, that the duty of nonmaleficence (to do no 
harm) is fundamental, and her belief that k i l l i n g consti-
tutes a harm to the embryo. 
I agree that embryos have interests that ought to be 
protected, but I do not agree that these interests are always 
best served by protecting their lives. What, after a l l , is to 
become of a fetus that survives the process of extraction 
f rom the womb? Presumably it is to be treated as a prema-
ture baby and placed i n an intensive care neonatal unit . 
Very premature infants tend not to survive despite the use 
of expensive technology, and those that do, r u n a very h i g h 
risk of being severely mentally and physical ly handi-
capped. Even those that survive intact may, i n some cir-
cumstances, have some diff iculty i n having good homes 
f o u n d (e.g., if they are of minor i ty races or if the mother 
carried some genetic disease or was a k n o w n substance 
abuser). Some social circumstances may be so oppressive 
that the mother can predict only a life of extreme hardship 
for her offspring, e.g., if she is a black mother i n South 
Afr i ca . If we consider practices w h i c h affect embryos early 
i n development, " s u r p l u s " embryos produced by in vitro 
fertil ization or "embryo f l u s h i n g " may be in demand from 
couples w i t h a distorted sense of the fetus as commodity, or 
whose heterosexists bias reflect parental values the mother 
finds unacceptable for chi ld-rearing. (For a truly frighten-
i n g version of a foreseeable Brave New World of reproduc-
tive control i n w h i c h one w o u l d not want one's chi ldren to 
be raised, see Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale.) 
Hence, it is not only ownership that might lead a 
w o m a n to want her embryo or fetus destroyed if she was no 
longer prepared to nurture it, but also her vis ion of threats 
facing the developing c h i l d . A n analysis attentive to the 
interests of chi ldren and women, as Overall insists is 
necessary, must recognize that protecting the interests of 
the embryo does not necessarily mean preserving its life. I 
th ink embryos are entitled to what philosophers cal l a 
"paternal ist" approach i n w h i c h others must decide the 
best interests of the developing organism; and it is legiti-
mate (and compatible w i t h Overall 's general theme that 
the interests of fetuses ought not to be viewed as being i n 
confl ict w i t h those of their mothers) that the person w h o 
has the most intimate relat ionship w i t h the fetus and w h o 
has the most invested i n its development—i.e., the 
mother—should be the one to decide on how its interests 
may best be served. 
Moreover, whi le her recommendation to a l low the 
mother to expel the fetus if she finds cont inuing preg-
nancy unacceptable may be logical ly consistent w i t h her 
view that no one has a r ight to secure the death of that 
fetus, i n practice this separation is dangerous to feminist 
aims. As Overal l acknowledges, surviving abortion may 
produce further harms to the fetus w h i c h , inevitably, put 
the w o m a n i n conflict w i t h the fetus i n the case of abor-
t ion. Surely, such conflicts w i l l again be considered as 
adequate grounds for restricting women's access to abor-
t ion. T h e dif f iculty here is that Overal l has strayed from 
her v is ion of seeing reproduction as a process w i t h mother 
and fetus conceptually and physical ly connected. For 
women, reproduction is far more involved than s imply 
hous ing the fetus, and it makes a mockery of their con-
cerns to imagine a social practice that can br ing about the 
independence of the fetus when the mother determines 
that the pregnancy can no longer be tolerated but is u n w i l -
l i n g to surrender the care of the fetus to the state. I believe 
women are i n a privileged posi t ion w i t h respect to the 
fetuses developing i n their bodies, and that, i n most cir-
cumstances, they are entitled to decide the future of those 
fetuses. T h i s is not because they o w n the fetuses, for they 
ought not to be free to sell them, but because they are 
responsible for them and should be trusted to decide if 
cont inued life when removed from the w o m b is i n the best 
interest of the fetus. A n y other pol icy, especially any 
w h i c h insists on trying to save every premature infant no 
matter h o w damaged, or w h i c h al lows the patriarchal 
state to determine the survival question, w o u l d be contrary 
to the interests of women and chi ldren. O n l y the mother is 
l ike ly to make such decisions i n a l o v i n g way (since I 
believe death can be a l o v i n g decision). W i t h o u t the 
authority to decide these questions women w i l l not have 
the reproductive freedom necessary, and, i n particular, 
they w i l l certainly have difficulty i n getting abortions. 
Despite my disagreement i n these important areas, I 
w i s h to recommend Overall 's book w i t h enthusiasm. It is 
wel l written and very wel l conceived. It is important to 
consider these various aspects and practices of reproduc-
t ion i n conjunct ion w i t h one another. Together they con-
stitute our attitudes about reproductive matters and about 
those persons most closely involved i n reproductive activ-
ity, women and chi ldren. Hence it is important to discuss 
the issues i n a comprehensive fashion, being sensitive to 
h o w our attitudes i n one area influence developing prac-
tice i n another. In particular, her discussion of the dangers 
of sex preselection and surrogacy help clarify the need to 
avoid a s imple analysis of consumer choice as the founda-
t ion for reproductive freedom i n matters of ch i ldb i r th and 
abort ion. T h e choice feminists are a r g u i n g for must be 
viewed as a comprehensive control over the reproductive 
aspects of our lives i n a manner compatible w i t h the 
autonomy of other women and chi ldren. T h i s book helps 
us to clarify that goal. 
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T h e Science Question i n Feminism. S. H a r d i n g . Ithaca: 
Cornell University, 1986, Pp. 271. 
In The Science Question in Feminism H a r d i n g takes on 
the most thorough analysis of feminist critiques of science 
to date. H a r d i n g does this through a discussion of what 
she considers to be the five m a i n research problematics of 
feminism and science. Her most important contr ibut ion 
to these projects comes i n her discussion of the future of 
science. As a standpoint theorist, H a r d i n g accepts that 
